In 1985, Mandela received an offer for his freedom. All he had to do was renounce the violence and help end the bloodshed.
Please listen to this video of P W Botha:
Are you aware that Nelson Mandela could not enter the United States without a special waiver until 2008? Up until that time, he was on a terrorist watch list. Ronald Reagan was instrumental in the classification of Mandela’s ANC (African National Congress) as a terrorist group. He cited the ANC as one of the world’s “most notorious terrorist groups.“ Now let’s pause there for just a moment. I want you to ask yourself whose judgment you would trust if given the choice. Would you trust George W. Bush or Ronald Reagan on correctly assessing the character of this man?
The argument is that Mandela was a different man in 1988 than he was in 2008, but I think we need to look hard at the facts and see that, in South Africa, there are people very much on edge even today. There was a revolution going on in South Africa, and it was not blacks killing whites (that would come later). It was the ANC killing anyone who opposed them or anyone who was in the wrong place at the wrong time, including over 20,000 blacks. Here is a video that you might find interesting. THIS revolution is still ongoing since 1994. Think again. Read the press release and information about the murders at the end of the article
WHO WAS MANDELA REALLY?
Rian Malan : the significance of the great statesman’s covert Communist party membership
This is a story about Nelson Mandela, the world-famous “freedom fighter” and “democrat.” You’ll have to pardon those slightly sardonic quotes, because I’m afraid this is that kind of story: a bit iconoclastic, and likely to provoke howls of outrage from Western liberals who see Mandela as a benign black moderate who led an army of hymn-singing Uncle Toms to the promised land.
The technical term for those liberals is “useful idiot,” but even I must concede that their intervention was actually quite intelligent, back in the 1950s, when this all started. In those days, good men were weak, and their apartheid adversaries invincible on all but one score: propaganda. The war of perceptions thus became the most critical of all battlefields, with the African National Congress constantly seeking to exaggerate apartheid’s evils while portraying itself as “good” in a way that was universally appealing.
In the early sixties, Special Branch detectives came upon a piece of evidence that made this a bit tricky in Mandela’s case – a handwritten essay titled, “How To Be A Good Communist,” in which the leader of the ANC’s newly-formed military wing opined that South Africa would become “a land of milk and honey” under Communist rule. We were told that Mandela was innocently toying with Marxist ideas, trying to understand their appeal, but this made little sense. Almost all his co-conspirators were Communists, wedded to a Sovietist doctrine that envisaged a two-phase ending to the SA struggle – a “national democratic revolution,” followed by second revolution in which the Marxist-Leninist vanguard took power.
If Mandela wasn’t in on this plot, it would have been exceptionally stupid of him to participate in it, and Mandela was not stupid. On the other hand, he had to be very careful what he said on this score. The ANC needed the support of Western liberals, and by 1964, those folks had come to realize that Communist revolutions inevitably led to the outcome satirized in George Orwell’s Animal Farm – a dictatorship of pigs who hogged the best things for themselves, impoverished the proletariat and murdered or imprisoned dissenters by the million.
In such a climate, one didn’t want to focus attention on that hand-written “milk and honey” essay. On the contrary: one wanted the world to see Mandela as a democrat, willing to die for values that Westerners held sacred. Toward this end, Mandela and his lawyers (with a bit of help from British journalist Anthony Sampson) crafted a masterful speech for Mandela to deliver from the dock during the Rivonia trial.
“The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African nationalism,” he said. “It is true that there has been close cooperation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But cooperation in this case is merely proof of a common goal – the removal of white supremacy.”
Mandela went to describe himself as a democrat in the classic Western sense, and a fervent admirer of the British and American systems of governance. “Africans just want a share in the whole of South Africa,” he said. “Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent…It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.”
These words rang out around the world, and still echo today. Type Mandela’s name into Google, and you come upon millions of essays, articles and book-length hagiographies depicting Madiba in exactly the way he presented himself in that speech: a black liberal, driven to take up arms by a white supremacist state that seemed utterly impermeable to calls for dialogue.
The Rivonia statement has become the foundational text of a semi-religious movement that seeks to canonize Mandela as the 20th century’s greatest proponent of freedom and democracy. Or perhaps I should say, “bourgeois democracy,” in order to distinguish between democracy of the sort practiced in Britain and America and the diseased parody encountered in Marxist-Leninist police states. Nelson Mandela never stood for that sort of democracy.
Or did he?
It takes a brave man to address that question, and lo, one such has emerged. Professor Stephen Ellis heads the African Studies Centre at the University of Leiden, and holds the Desmond Tutu chair of social sciences at the Vrije University of Amsterdam. He is also one of the great authorities on the ANC, author of Comrades Against Apartheid and a former editor of Africa Confidential, a magazine valued for its authoritative gossip about what was really going inside the anti-apartheid movement in the 1980’s.
Now Ellis has published a study that sheds startling new light on Mandela’s early political career and the circumstances under which he launched his armed struggle against apartheid. The study contains at least one revelation that can only be described as a bombshell — Mandela was, at least for a time, secretly a member of South Africa’s Communist Party.
The strange thing about Ellis’s bombshell is that South Africans appear to be deaf to its detonation. I know this because I started hyping it to fellow journalists the instant it appeared in print. To a man (or woman) they all shrugged and said, “So what? It’s not really a story.” This tells us something interesting about South Africans: we are at once riven with ideological obsessions and hopelessly ideologically naïve.
The blame for this rests largely on our charming and literate Communists, who go to great pains in their memoirs to disguise the true nature of their beliefs. They tell us that they stood for fairness, justice, and racial equality, and against all forms of exploitation and oppression. They’d also like us to believe that their party was outlawed in l950 because they treated blacks as friends and wanted them to enjoy the franchise. Well, yes. I suppose this was a factor, but the overriding consideration that led to the SACP’s banning was something else entirely.
At the Yalta Conference of 1945, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin assured the Western powers that all the countries his forces occupied at the end of World War 2 would be allowed to determine their own destinies via free elections. With his international image in mind, Stalin instructed commissars in the occupied territories to observe the outward forms of “bourgeois democracy.” Towards this end, liberals and social democrats were lured into broad fronts in which all key decisions were secretly made by tiny Communist minorities, with the backing of the Soviet’s secret police apparatus.
These Communist conspirators then staged spurious elections that brought Soviet puppet regimes to power throughout Eastern Europe, usually with majorities implausibly close to 100 percent. Historians concede that Tito of Yugoslavia was genuinely popular, but elsewhere, the rule of Soviet proxies was imposed by deceit and enforced by tyranny. Tens of thousands of class enemies were executed, millions imprisoned, all vestiges of freedom eradicated.
The problem with Communist parties, including the South African one, is that they blindly supported this Soviet outrage, and seemed intent on pulling similar moves everywhere. If Joe Slovo and Rusty Bernstein were still alive, they’d stoutly deny such charges, but they’d be lying. We know this because Rusty’s wife Hilda lived long enough to acquire a shrewd understanding of herself and the Communist movement of which she was a life-long part. “Joe and Rusty were hardline Stalinists,” she said in a 2004 interview. “Anything the Soviets did was right. They were very, very pro-Soviet.”
It is important to note that Mrs. Bernstein was by no means suggesting that her husband or Joe were evil men. On the contrary: they were religious zealots who genuinely believed that the Soviets had discovered the cure for all human misery.
“I’ve often thought about this,” she said. “They wanted something bigger than themselves, something to believe in. People are always seeking for the meaning of life and if you’re not religious, what is it? To us, working together in a movement that had rules and attitudes and comradeship gave important meaning to our lives.”
In short, being a Communist was much like being a Christian. One studied the sacred texts of Marx and Engels, engaged in polemics as a form of prayer and ruthlessly suppressed all doubts, including one’s own. Mrs. Bernstein says she was adept at this until l956, when Kruschev revealed the appalling extent of his predecessor Stalin’s atrocities (he murdered around 16 million people, either by having them shot for thought crimes or starving them to death with mad policies). Her husband dismissed these reports as “lies and capitalist propaganda,” but Hilda’s bones told her it was all true.
“We had a fight,” she said, “a battle that went on into the small hours of the morning. I wanted to leave, but we had three dependent children, and there wasn’t any possible way in which we could have separated economically and so on. So we stayed together, and I accommodated myself by refusing to talk about it any more.”
And so it came to pass that Hilda Bernstein, the secret doubter, had a ringside seat for the epochal events of the late fifties and early sixties, a time when her husband Rusty was one of South Africa’s most senior Communists, and one of Mandela’s closest allies moreover.
It was in this capacity that she learned of Madiba’s secret membership in the Communist sect. “Mandela denies that he was ever a member of the party,” she said, “but I can tell you that he was a member of the party for a period.”
When this interview appeared on the website of the O’Malley archive, it caused a brief frisson among old Cold Warriors, especially when former SACP central committee member Brian Bunting verified Hilda’s account. The interview also caught the eye of the aforementioned Professor Ellis, a lifelong student of the byzantine inner workings of SACP. He notes that the SACP of the early sixties was of necessity a pathologically secretive organization, a network of cells with little or no knowledge of each other and no official membership records.
“SACP members were formally required to keep their membership secret,” says Ellis. “In principle, only the members of each four or five-person cell knew each other. One person reported to the next higher level, and so on. But there was also a special category of ultra-secret members who were not required to join a cell and whom even very senior party members might not know about.” With this in mind, Ellis proceeded very cautiously before publishing anything about Mandela’s apparent role in the Communist conspiracy.
One item in his files was an old police report claiming that two arrested Communists had identified Mandela as an SACP member. A similar admission appeared in the minutes of a 1982 SACP meeting. The final breakthrough came when Russian researcher Irina Filitova interviewed veteran conspirator Joe Matthews, who confirmed that Mandela served on the party’s innermost central committee alongside him. “In the light of this evidence,” Ellis concludes, “it seems most likely that Nelson Mandela joined the party in the late 1950’s or in 1960, and that he was co-opted onto the Central Committee in the latter year, the same year as Joe Matthews.”
Even as I write this I sense that I am losing the average South African. I can almost see you shrugging and saying, “So? This still isn’t a story.” But it is a story, and here’s why: if Ellis’s evidence is correct, the fatal decision to launch a war against apartheid had nothing to do with the ANC.
It was a decision taken unilaterally by the Communist Party, and then imposed on ANC president Albert Luthuli by a prominent African nationalist who was secretly a member of the Communist underground. His name: Nelson Mandela.
It seems fair to say that black South Africans have entertained thoughts of armed revolt since the day Jan van Riebeeck landed in Table Bay. It is therefore clear, as Ellis stresses in his landmark paper, that no political party held a patent on the term armed struggle. The Pan-Africanist Congress was dead keen on it, and elements in the ANC thought it was inevitable from the early fifties onwards.
The difference between those organizations and the Communist Party is that peaceful change via the ballot box was never really on the Communist agenda, because that sort of change invariably left the capitalist edifice standing. “Classes do not commit suicide,” said Joe Slovo, a dutiful acolyte of Vladimir Lenin. Enemies of the working class had to be undermined, subverted, and conclusively defeated before the socialist millennium could begin.
There was a time when this socialist millennium did not seem particularly attractive to South Africa’s so-called “bourgeois nationalists,” Marxist code for Africans who would have been perfectly happy to defeat the Boers in a bourgeois democratic election and then help themselves to a fairer share of the nation’s riches. Communists did not approve of “bourgeois nationalists,” and vice versa, which is one reason why Nelson Mandela spent the l940s breaking up Communist rallies with his fists.
In the early fifties, however, the SACP realized that cooperating with the nationalists was likely to hasten the fall of the Boers, thus creating conditions conducive to a more rapid advance towards true socialism. At more or less the same time, nationalists like Mandela realized that the Communists could bring several desirables to the party. Around half of them were white. They had cars, houses, telephones, organizational skills and access to funding. Soon, Communists were supporting the ANC’s legal campaigns and recruiting ANC members into their own underground party.
As Ellis observes, this strategy did not enjoy the approval of the high priests of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary science, who were located in Moscow. It was a home-grown initiative, devised as a means of amplifying the influence of a tiny body of true believers. (At the time, the SACP had barely 500 members.) The SACP was thus delighted to discover, at a 1960 conference in Moscow, that these high priests were now thinking along similar lines. The imperial powers were pulling out of Africa, and alliances with previously detestable nationalists provided a way for tiny bands of Communist intellectuals to stay in the game, and perhaps wind up in control of a few key ex-colonies.
Out of this emerged the SACP’s new revolutionary doctrine, which has always reminded me of the hoary old fable in which a scorpion convinces a frog to carry it across a river. The frog (or bourgeois nationalist) does all the work, staging a “democratic national revolution” that topples the imperial or colonial power. The scorpion (representing the Communist cause) goes along for the ride, only to sting the frog to death just as it reaches the far bank. The punchline of the original remains entirely apposite: scorpions do such things because that is their nature.
Something else happened in l960, something very important. The catalyst was the PAC, a movement of hardline African nationalists who’d broken away from the ANC the previous year on the grounds that it was “dominated by white Communists” whose ultimate loyalties were open to question (see above). In April, l960, the PAC staged a nationwide protest against the hated pass laws. In Sharpeville, police opened fire on a crowd of PAC supporters, killing an estimated 69. The resulting outburst of rage shook the apartheid government to its core, and led to the outright banning of both the PAC and ANC.
From afar, it seemed that the mood in South Africa had at last turned revolutionary, which is presumably why Joe Matthews and Michael Harmel of the SACP were given a stellar reception when they turned up in Beijing a few months later to canvass support for armed struggle.
According to Ellis, the Chinese had previously been sceptical of such plans, but now, the SACP delegates were considered so important that Chairman Mao himself took time to meet them. They were accorded a similar honour in Moscow, where they apparently stayed in Stalin’s former dacha while conducting top-secret talks with senior Soviet officials.
The precise outcome of these discussions remains uncertain, but Ellis presumes that Matthews and Harmel came away with pledges of support, because the SACP now moved swiftly forward, adopting a policy of armed struggle at a conference in Johannesburg “towards the end of 1960.”
It now became necessary for the SACP to convince the ANC to join its initiative. White Communists couldn’t act in this regard, because they weren’t allowed to join the racially exclusive ANC or take part in its deliberations. The task thus fell to black ANC leaders who wore two hats – which is to say, were members of both the ANC and the SACP. In some cases, this joint ANC-SACP affiliation was open and well-known, at least to those in the underground. In others, it was secret. The most important of these secret members was the charismatic Nelson Mandela.
On the day the SACP took its fateful decision, Mandela was a defendant in the Treason Trial, a marathon affair that had been dragging on since l956. The rest of South Africa was extremely tense, but inside Judge Rumpff’s courtroom, the atmosphere was oddly congenial, considering that Mandela and his co-accused were on trial for high treason, and that the three judges were officials of a white supremacist regime that Mandela frequently characterized as “Nazi.”
In theory, the gap between the white judges and the mostly black accused was unbridgeable, but these men had been staring at one another across the courtroom for years, sparring, joking, taking each other’s measure and acquiring a measure of mutual respect.
All the accused were out on bail, but when they were re-detained during the post-Sharpeville State of Emergency, Judge Bekker’s wife came to their aid, running errands on their behalf and carrying messages to their families. Judge Kennedy was so impressed by the pro-ANC testimony of Professor ZK Matthews that he came down from the bench and shook Matthews’ hand, saying, “I hope we meet again under better circumstances.” Judge Rumpff was a grumpy old Afrikaner and a reputed Broederbonder, but even he seemed to be softening.
On March 23,m 1961, Rumpff took the unprecedented step of interrupting the defence’s closing argument, saying, in effect, we don’t really need to hear this. Some of the accused took this to mean that the judges had decided to disregard the evidence and hang them – the predictable totalitarian outcome. They were wrong. A week later, Rumpff asked the accused to rise, and pronounced every one of them innocent.
This was a dumbfounding outcome, given the enormous resources the apartheid state had devoted to the treason case. Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd was in the habit of telling the world that most blacks supported the principle of separate development, and that only a handful of misguided troublemakers opposed it. Rumpff’s judgement annihilated that argument. In rejecting the state’s case, he had in effect ruled that the ANC’s cause was just, its grievances legitimate, and its strategy of non-violent defiance acceptable in the eyes of reasonable men.
This outcome hugely strengthened the hand of ANC president Albert Luthuli, a devout Christian who continued to believe that peaceful change was possible in South Africa. After the Sharpeville shootings, his stance was bitterly criticized by ANC radicals, who thought the time for talking was over. Rumpff’s verdict suggested otherwise. It showed that South Africa was still a land of law, with judges willing to hand down decisions that infuriated the ruling party.
South Africa also had a relatively free press, a vigorous democracy (albeit for whites only) and, as Mandela acknowledges in Long Walk To Freedom, a police force that still conformed to British norms, with due process respected and torture at this stage unheard-of. Some observers saw Rumpff’s verdict as a watershed of sorts, a development that could easily have led to further liberalization.
Nelson Mandela was totally disinterested. In Long Walk To Freedom, he writes that he went underground within hours of Rumpff’s verdict. Officially, his mission was to organize popular support for a national convention, but Ellis thinks this unlikely. “A close analysis of the campaign for a national convention concludes that this initiative was primarily intended to provide proponents of armed struggle with a paper trail that would justify their forthcoming change of policy,” he writes.
In other words, the SACP was angling to regain the moral high ground. It knew that the verdict had come as a surprise to international observers, who were left wondering if Verwoerd’s regime was indeed as evil as it was held to be. But the SACP also knew that Verwoerd could be relied on to reject any call for a national convention, thus restoring his reputation as an intransigent racist. As Ellis notes, this would allow the party to present the coming declaration of war “in the best possible light for public and international consumption.”
The second leg of Mandela’s underground mission was of course to convince ANC president Albert Luthuli to follow the lead the Communists had taken. Luthuli was not a pacifist per se, but he believed that non-violent options remained viable. Like many others in the ANC and even the SACP, he also believed it would be folly of the highest order to take up arms at a point when the ANC was still struggling to organize effective protests.
Luthuli and Mandela had it out in June 1961, at a tumultuous meeting of the ANC’s national executive in Tongaat, Natal. The debate raged through the night, but when the sun rose, Mandela was triumphant; the ANC had authorized him to launch Umkhonto we Sizwe, and to start making preparations for war against the apartheid state.
This is Mandela’s version – or more accurately, one of his versions. In Long Walk, he acknowledges that the outcome of his clash with Luthuli was actually very messy. “The policy of the ANC would still be that of non-violence,” he writes, and the new military organization was required to be “entirely separate from the ANC.” Luthuli himself remained committed to non-violence until his death six years later.
Reading between the lines, Mandela seems to be suggesting that Luthuli was willing to turn a blind eye to his military adventure, provided it did not damage the mother organization. Durban Communist Rowley Arenstein rejected this out hand. “Luthuli was simply brushed aside,” he said. “Adoption of armed struggle by the ANC was the act of a Johannesburg SACP clique, a hijacking.”
Arenstein was subsequently purged from the party. Mandela returned to Johannesburg to plan his sabotage campaign, heedless of the counsel of men with clearer heads. “If you throw a stone into the window of a man’s house,” said SACP general secretary Moses Kotane, “you must be prepared for him to come out and chase you. The backlash will be fantastic. The police will go mad.”
The first MK bombs went off on December 16, 1961. The rest is history.
This article was published with the assistance of the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit (FNF). The views presented in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of FNF.
MURDERS IN SOUTH AFRICA: IS THIS DEMOCRATIC AND FREEDOM?
Murder is a sub-category of “violent crime”. The official state statistics claim that while, since 1994, all sub-categories of “violent crime” are on the increase, murder is the only sub-category on the decrease. However, these statistics are contested, for example, Interpol have South African murder statistics that are roughly double the official South African state statistics, while the South African Medical Research Council claim there are roughly a third more murders in South Africa than the official police statistics reveal. This castes doubt on the New South African government’s claim that the murder rate has in fact decreased since 1994.
According to official data released by the SA Police Service 410,804 people were murdered in South Africa between 1994, when liberals put the ANC in power, and 31 March 2014.
How many of the following statistics belong to immigrants and illegals in South Africa?
We refer here to woefully inadequate policing of borders, rampant corruption at Home Affairs and a tendency on the part of some police to look the other way in return for payoffs. This opened the country to an invasion of millions and millions of immigrants and illegals .
The number of murders increased by 5% and attempted murder by 4.6% over the period 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014, compared to the previous financial year, reaching a total of 17,068 murders. This calculates to almost 47 murders each day, or just under two murders every hour. “That sort of figure is what one would expect in a war zone.” Democratic Alliance MP Dianne Kohler Barnard said.
South Africa’s official murder rate increased to 32.2 per 100,000 people, but what does this mean to the average citizen? How many are illegals and immigrants?
5 December 2014Dr. Greg Stanton of Genocide Watch Warns of Crime in South AfricaAt a press conference at the Transvaal Agricultural Union today, Dr. Gregory Stanton, Founding President of Genocide Watch, warned that early warnings of genocide are still deep in South African society, though genocide has not begun.Dr. Stanton was deeply involved in the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, worked against Apartheid with the United Democratic Front in 1989 – 1990 as a Fulbright Professor of Law at the University of Swaziland, and was the author of the UN Resolutions that created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994. He was also the legal advisor to the government of Cambodia and drafted the rules for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. He founded Genocide Watch and the International Alliance to End Genocide in 1999. The Alliance now has fifty member organizations in 24 countries.Genocide Watch was the first international human rights organization to protest the murders and hate crimes committed against farmers in South Africa. Since his research trip in July 2012, Dr. Stanton said that hate crimes against Afrikaner farmers have not declined. The murder rate of the whole South African population remains at over 31 per 100,000. The murder rate of farmers, including Afrikaner farmers, is four times as high. The Institute of Security Studies estimated the farm murder rate at 120 per 100,000 in 2013, and the Transvaal Agricultural Union, using verified names of victims, placed the figure at 130 per 100,000 in 2013, one of the highest murder rates in the world.Since 2007, the South African government has denied and covered up the crisis by not releasing any breakdown of how murders are distributed among ethnic groups in South Africa. American and European governments have remained silent about the problem, reinforcing the campaign of denial.Several years ago the Marxist racist, Julius Malema, then President of the African National Congress Youth League, revived the singing of the “Shoot the Farmer, Kill the Boer” song, once a revolutionary song, but now an incitement to commit genocide. A South African judge declared that singing of the song is a hate crime and prohibited Malema from singing the “Kill the Boer” song. But then the South African President, Jacob Zuma, sang the song himself, in direct contempt for the judge’s ruling. Malema was later expelled from the ANC over an unrelated conflict with Zuma. He formed his own political party, the EFF, which has continued to promote a Marxist, racist agenda, and Malema was elected to Parliament. Jacob Zuma remains President of South Africa.Dr. Stanton pointed out that Incitement to Commit Genocide is a crime under both international and South African law. He said that Malema should be put on trial for incitement to commit genocide and Zuma should be impeached, both for violating South African laws against incitement, and for massive corruption.Dr. Stanton noted that recent studies of the correlation between corruption and atrocities committed by governments show that the relationship is direct. Once in power, corrupt governments cling to power because of the enormous wealth their officials amass. They then persecute, torture, and murder anyone who challenges their grip on power. That downward spiral has begun in South Africa, just as it did in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe it resulted in the Gukurahunde genocide against Joshua Nkomo’s Matabele people and Mugabe’s repression of the MDC.The conviction rate has dropped from 32 percent ten years ago to about 22 percent today. This trend must be reversed. Police must be given education and training so they become competent and motivated crime fighters. An honest, educated, and dedicated police force is the strong arm of justice.Private security companies should coordinate their systems, use infra-red, aerial and other advanced technology to detect criminals quickly and summon both armed private security companies and police to arrest criminals. Then their cases must be pressed until they are imprisoned.Criminal gangs from other African countries should be deported.The South African government must make stopping farm murders a priority. 30,000 commercial farmers supply most of South Africa’s food. South Africa cannot afford to lose their long experience in management. Training people once excluded from management will take several generations, not just a few years.The first step is for the South African government to admit that farm murders are a serious threat not just to Afrikaner and white farmers, but to all South Africans, and make stopping these crimes a priority.
The second step is to arrest and convict or impeach corrupt political leaders.
The most important step is for South Africans of all ethnic groups to recognize that we are all members of the same race, the human race.
South Africans must reject the cynical manipulation of racial resentments by politicians like Julius Malema and his Marxist racist followers.
South Africa needs effective security for all of its people. Without security, democracy is impossible.
FACT: THERE IS NO DEMOCRACY OR ANY FREEDOM
>>>> We as a minority group still have to focus on the self-determination of our own land and volkstaat, this is still outstanding <<<<
ANOTHER QUESTION RAISED: DID ANY OF THE WHITES, BOERS AND AFRIKANERS SUPPORTED THE CHAOS IN SOUTH AFRICA TODAY? NO …
How many voting papers were really counted and others were picking up in the field since 1994?
HERE IS THE REFERENDUM QUESTION IN 1992
The question we put to the electorate on 17 March 1992 was
“Do you support the continuation of the reform process that the State President started on 2 February 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiations?”
Nothing about that communists or criminals can take over
Empty Promises from FW de Klerk:
In the run-up to the referendum I told audiences that I was not asking for a blank cheque. I said that we had already reached broad consensus in the negotiations on a number of key points regarding the future constitution. These included a multi-party democratic system; a parliament comprising an upper and lower house; the necessity for a Bill of Rights; the separation of powers; the independence of the judiciary; proportional representation; a strong regional basis for the future dispensation; the maintenance of language and cultural rights; and community-based education for those who want it. I said that there were a number of issues on which we were still seeking consensus. They included the prevention of domination and the abuse of power; effective protection of minorities; the protection of property rights; career security for public servants; a market-based free enterprise economy; maximum constitutional protection for regional and municipal government; and the dispersal of the powers that were then concentrated in the hands of the State President. I truly believe that it was on 17 March 1992 that the great majority of white South Africans finally and decisively turned their backs on 350 years of white domination. In my victory speech on 18 March 1992 I said that they had finally closed the book on apartheid. “The White electorate has reached out, through this landslide win for the YES vote, to all our compatriots, to all other South Africans and the message of this referendum is: Today, in a certain sense, is the real birthday of the new South African nation.”
more about this at a later stage…
>>>> remember <<<<<
THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE